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1. Introduction
Logistical infrastructure builds the backbone of an 
economy (Panasyuk et al., 2013). Without an eﬀ ec-
tive logistical infrastructure in place, logistical pro-
cesses are more diﬃ  cult (i.e. might take longer and 
arrive late, might face quality problems, and might 
lead to higher cost), and demand for both enter-
prises and consumers might not be met. But even a 
high-quality logistical infrastructure can be threat-
ened by risks.
One out of many examples is the blocking of the 
Suez Canal in 2004 by the broken-down tanker 
‘Tropic Brilliance’. Th e tanker experienced problems 
with the steering gear and grounded itself. At this 
location the Suez Canal was too narrow for other 
vessels to pass, so that the logistical infrastructure 
was blocked for any transportation processes. For 
39 vessels already in the Suez Canal and another 113 
ships waiting at the two entrances, this accident led 
to an unplanned delay of their transport chains of a 
few days (Ibrahim, 2004)1. Th e delay in return cre-
ated even more problems for the supply chains the 
vessels were part of: Sony Corporation, for exam-
ple, faced serious problems fulﬁ lling customer de-
mand for PlayStations in the UK (which was higher 
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Logistical infrastructure builds the backbone of an economy. Without an eﬀ ective logistical infrastructure 
in place, the supply for both enterprises and consumers might not be met. But even a high-quality logistical 
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sequences onto the logistical network. We will demonstrate the relevance of this approach by applying it 
to the logistics network of the central German state of Hesse. Even though transport data is extensively 
tracked and recorded nowadays, typical daily risks, like accidents on a motorway, and extraordinary risks, 
like a bridge at risk to collapse, terrorist attacks or climate-related catastrophes, are not systematically 
anticipated. Several studies unveiled recently that the overall impact for an economy of possible failures of 
single nodes and/or edges in a network are not calculated, and particularly critical edges are not identiﬁ ed 
in advance. We address this information gap by a method that helps to identify and quantify risks in a given 
network. To reach this objective, we deﬁ ne a mathematical optimization model that quantiﬁ es the current 
“risk-related costs” of the overall network and quantify the risk by investigating the change of the overall 
costs in the case a risk is realized.
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than normal due to Christmas sales), because the 
supply was stuck in the Suez Canal (Elliott, Th eo-
doulou, 2004)2. In the end, Sony paid a high price to 
match demand, since as a result of the unintended 
situation in the Suez Canal; it chartered Russian An-
tonov AN-124 planes to ship PlayStations directly 
from China to the UK (Manners-Bell, 2014: 61-62). 
What can be derived from this example is how the 
(even temporary) blocking, or in general: unavail-
ability, of logistical infrastructure can lead to tre-
mendous negative eﬀ ects on supply chains.
Th us, it is important to identify, analyse, and evalu-
ate risks for logistical infrastructure that might 
threaten logistical processes. Only if those risks are 
known and their impact estimated, decision makers 
can plan and implement counteractive measures to 
reduce risks.
2. Basics of risk management for logistical 
infrastructure
2.1 The importance of logistical infrastructure
Logistics has always played a major role for econo-
mies. Examples show, that this has been true for pro-
jects on the regional or national level (such as for the 
building of the pyramids in Egypt) as well as for in-
ternational trade such as between China and Europe 
using the Silk Road. Nowadays, the role of logistics 
is even bigger than before. In Germany, for example, 
the logistics sector is the 3rd biggest industry (behind 
the automotive industry and the retail sector), with 
an estimated total revenue of 240 billion EUR (Bun-
desvereinigung Logistik (BVL) e. V., 2016)3.
Logistics might be deﬁ ned as ‘the process of stra-
tegically managing the procurement, movement, 
and storage of materials, parts and ﬁ nished inven-
tory (and the related information ﬂ ows) through the 
organisation and its marketing channels in such a 
way that current and future probability are maxim-
ised though the cost-eﬀ ective fulﬁ lment of orders’ 
(Christopher, 2011: 2). In our particular work we 
will have a more narrow understanding of the term 
“logistics” as the management and organization of 
all transportation processes of physical goods plus 
any necessary storage and handling processes. Th is 
includes freight logistics as well as public transpor-
tation and the transport of any personnel.
Additionally we can agree on the 6 ‘r’ of logistics: 
Logistics ensures that the right product in the right 
quantity and the right quality is delivered at the right 
time to the right place or customer for the right cost 
(Jünemann, 1989: 18). To provide logistical services 
at a promised service level, certain prerequisites are 
necessary. One of the prerequisites is the logistical 
infrastructure.
Logistical infrastructure can be summarized as all 
facilities necessary to complete the logistical mis-
sion. Th ose facilities include production and distri-
bution facilities as well as the transportation links 
between them (Closs, Th omson, 1992: 269). If we 
focus on the basic logistical processes such as trans-
portation, warehousing, and handling, then those 
facilities can be classiﬁ ed into two types: On one 
hand, the logistical infrastructure consists of logis-
tical nodes where goods are stored and handled. 
Th ose nodes can be any warehouse or transhipment 
point. On the other hand, there are logistical edges 
that are used for connecting logistical nodes. Th ose 
connecting edges are used for transportation pro-
cesses. Possible additional so-called value-adding 
services are normally also carried out in the logisti-
cal nodes. We will, however, focus on the classical 
logistical processes such as transportation, han-
dling, and storing.
Th e logistical infrastructure is a necessary prereq-
uisite to provide logistical services. Without infra-
structure, logistical services are not possible. How-
ever, the availability, capacity, and quality of the 
logistical infrastructure inﬂ uence the performance 
of logistics. A good infrastructure enables smooth, 
fast, and eﬃ  cient logistical processes, whereas a 
low level of the infrastructure hinders logistical 
performance. Th is becomes obvious when analys-
ing the results of the World Bank that evaluated the 
logistical performance of 160 countries using the 
so-called ‘international logistics performance in-
dicator’ (international LPI). Th e LPI consists of six 
components; and one of the components is infra-
structure (Arvis et al., 2014: 7)4. Th e results of the 
analysis show that countries, that are ranked within 
the top 10 logistics performers (such as Germany 
as the overall number one on the list), also have a 
dense and high-quality infrastructure; on the other 
hand, countries within the bottom 10 (such as So-
malia) also have an infrastructure far below average 
(Arvis et al., 2014: 34-37).
In 1996 President Bill Clinton ﬁ rst mentioned the 
term “Critical Infrastructure” in his Executive Or-
der 13010, which ultimately resulted in the inaugu-
ration of the President’s Commission on Critical In-
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frastructure Protection. Th e order deﬁ nes a critical 
infrastructure: “Certain national infrastructures are 
so vital that their incapacity or destruction would 
have a debilitating impact on the defence or eco-
nomic security of the United States.” Applying that 
deﬁ nition to the transportation infrastructure of a 
region, state, country or supranational network, a 
critical logistical infrastructure is a certain part of 
this network that its (temporarily) unavailability 
would have a highly negative impact on the possibil-
ity to supply certain nodes in the network properly. 
Th is negative impact can be either the complete 
cut-oﬀ  of parts of the network or a substantial rise 
in operational costs.
2.2 Risks concerning the logistical infrastructure
Th e role and the importance of logistical infrastruc-
ture lead to the assumption, that possible threads 
to the infrastructure inﬂ uence its availability and 
its quality. Th is, in return, has implications for the 
logistical performance. For example, the overturn 
of a vessel on an inland waterway might hinder any 
other vessel to pass this location until the vessel is 
recovered. Th e ﬂ ow of goods might then be halted 
or rerouted. Th e rerouting, however, will lead to 
higher costs if other means of transportation have 
to be used. On the other hand, if the ﬂ ow of goods 
is stopped, there might be cost due to out-of-stock 
situations. Furthermore, due to the high intercon-
nectivity between diﬀ erent modes of transports or 
diﬀ erent logistical sub-infrastructures, every failure 
or blockade of one single edge can progress to a fail-
ure or blockade of whole parts of the network or, in 
the worst case, even to the halt of all logistical ﬂ ows 
within the network. As an example one might con-
sider a logistical infrastructure with a very central-
ized structure. If the central node in that network is 
the central airport as well as the central train station 
and the central port of the whole network, a total 
blockade of that very node could lead to a full halt of 
all logistics within the network not transported via 
the street network. Th is abstract-looking risk is not 
as abstract as it seems and might, for instance, be 
realized if Greater London is cut oﬀ  from the power 
network for a certain period of time.
Logistical infrastructure can be threatened by a 
number of risks. Diﬀ erent approaches to risk clas-
siﬁ cation, also focusing on logistics, are available 
(for example Heckmann et al., 2015: 122-127). To 
demonstrate the variety of risks that might inﬂ u-
ence availability and quality of the logistical infra-
structure, we use the results of the latest study by 
Allianz5 (Allianz SE/Allianz Global Corporate & 
Specialty SE (2016)).
Figure 1 Top business risks 2016

Source: Allianz SE/Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE (2016), p. 1
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Figure 1 shows the top ten risks that might threaten 
businesses, as identiﬁ ed and ranked by Allianz. Th e 
dark blue bars reﬂ ect risks that have a connection 
to the logistical infrastructure, whereas the light 
blue bars have no link to the logistical infrastruc-
ture or the inﬂ uence can be neglected. Business in-
terruptions, including supply chain disruptions, are 
identiﬁ ed as the absolute top risks for businesses. 
However, one of the risks that have an increasing 
importance for business is cyber incidents. Due to 
changes in technology that lead to a wider digitali-
zation of processes, the vulnerability of such pro-
cesses increases (Zimmermann, 2004: 2). Th is is 
especially true for digitalized processes between 
two or more companies, as promised by Industry 
4.0 approaches (Brettel et al., 2014). Natural catas-
trophes can have a major impact on logistical in-
frastructure. Examples for natural catastrophes are 
the Tōhoku earthquake and the following tsunami 
in 2011, which led to major damage to the criti-
cal infrastructure in Japan, and the eruption of the 
Icelandic volcano Eyjafj allajökull, which led to the 
closure of airspace and thus impacted air travel and 
air cargo all over Europe (Jones, Bolivar, 2011). Th e 
risk of natural disasters and geological catastrophes 
is getting higher every year as recent studies show 
(Munich Re, 2016)6. Another risk with increasing 
importance is the risk of a terror attack. One exam-
ple is the bombings in Brussels in 2016, where two 
types of infrastructure (airport, underground) had 
been attacked by terrorists simultaneously; thus, 
those attacks aﬀ ected the whole public transporta-
tion in Belgium.
2.3 Risk management
Risks are an immanent factor to all processes. Th us, 
it is not possible to fully exclude risk to establish 
certainty. To integrate risk in business and to be able 
to plan under risk, risk management oﬀ ers an eﬀ ec-
tive framework. Risk management can be deﬁ ned 
as “the identiﬁ cation, assessment, and prioritization 
of risks followed by coordinated and economical 
application of resources to minimize, monitor, and 
control the probability and/or impact of unfortu-
nate events.” (Hubbard, 2009: 10)
Risk management can and should be seen as an iter-
ative process chain. Th is risk management process 
is standardized by ISO 31000, which describes the 
diﬀ erent phases of risk management as depicted in 
Figure 2.
Figure 2 Risk management process

Source: Purdy (2010: 883)
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Th e central steps in the risk management process 
are the risk assessment and, to actually handle the 
risk, the risk treatment. However, without a solid 
and eﬀ ective risk assessment, risk treatment is not 
possible.
Risk assessment can be divided into three steps: Th e 
ﬁ rst step is to identify potential threats. It is actually 
the process of searching for known and unknown 
risks. In the second step, those risks that have been 
identiﬁ ed with the risk identiﬁ cation are now ana-
lysed. Th at is, “risk analysis is concerned with de-
veloping an understanding of each risk, its conse-
quences, and the likelihood of those consequences.” 
(Purdy, 2010: 884) Th e last step of the risk assess-
ment is to evaluate and prioritize risks. Th is step is 
preparing risk treatment. However, often resources 
– staﬀ , money, time, etc. – are limited, so that an ef-
ﬁ cient allocation of existing resources is necessary. 
Risk evaluation that aims to make a decision about 
the ‘level’ of risk is thus the foundation of risk treat-
ment.
Applied to the context of logistical infrastructures, 
the ﬁ rst step reﬂ ects the identiﬁ cation of parts of 
the infrastructure that are more threatened by the 
potential realisation of any risk than others. Th is 
could be parts of the infrastructure that seem to 
be “attractive” to terrorists, as they are extremely 
vulnerable or critical to the infrastructure, or to 
those parts that are exposed to harsh geographic 
surroundings, for example by crossing earthquake 
infected or ﬂ ood threatened regions. Th is phase of 
the risk management process is not further exam-
ined within this paper. Instead, we will focus on the 
second and the third step by presenting an approach 
that “puts a price tag” on a risk. 
Although risks can only be reduced or avoided by 
applying the next phase of the risk management 
process (the ‘risk treatment’), it is obvious that risk 
assessment plays a major role in risk management. 
Th us, this article focuses on risk assessment by pro-
posing a model that helps to identify, analyse, and 
evaluate risks for the logistical infrastructure.
3. A network optimization approach 
3.1 Basic idea
A multi-modal logistical infrastructure is used 
by a number of diﬀ erent actors at the same time. 
In reality those are, at least in some multi-modal 
sub-networks, logistical actors, private persons 
and public transport means. In contrast to a supply 
chain, where some regulating higher instance can 
coordinate the whole network, such a (partly) pub-
lic network cannot be governed directly. In particu-
lar, this has an immense eﬀ ect on the risk analysis 
and assessment of the infrastructure as a whole and 
all of its parts. To be able to receive a valid risk as-
sessment the behaviour of all users of the network 
before and after the realisation of a risk has to be an-
ticipated. Th e risk assessment, which means meas-
uring the grade of the damage, can then be seen as 
the cost diﬀ erence caused by the realisation of the 
risk. To quantify this, the whole network has to be 
valued as a whole twice, once before the risk realisa-
tion and once afterwards. 
3.2 Assumptions
To enable an assessment of the network the follow-
ing assumptions are made:
 •  Th e network has a ﬁ nite number of well-de-
ﬁ ned points, called communities,
 •  For every community a net demand or net 
supply, given in transportation units (TU), is 
given,
 •  For every connection between two commu-
nities a capacity limit in TU per time unit is 
given,
 • For every connection costs per TU are known.
Furthermore, we assume that the network is closed, 
which means that every TU, which is supplied in a 
community v inside the network, is demanded by, 
and transported to, any target community w inside 
the network. However, this assumption does not 
restrict the model in any way, as any non-closed 
network can easily be transformed into a closed 
network by introducing dummy communities that 
represent external supply or demand. Finally, we 
assume that all actors within the network act eco-
nomically, maximizing their own proﬁ t. Explic-
itly this means that private uses of the network, 
like public transport means, that might also use a 
certain capacity on selected connections between 
communities, cannot be modelled. Implicitly such 
non-logistical users can be considered by lowering 
the capacity by the value of the mean of other usage 
before modelling the network.
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3.3 Network deﬁ nition
Th e logistical network of the observed region can be 
modelled as a graph . Every vertex  
then represents a community within the network 
and every edge  represents a single 
direct connection between two communities. Fur-
thermore, let  be the net supply or demand of 
community  per time unit t. Supplying com-
munities have a negative value, while demanding 
communities have a positive value. As we assume, 
as presented above, that the network is closed, the 
following equation holds:
෍ ݓሺݒሻ
׊௩א௏
ൌ Ͳ
Finally, all edges have a non-negative capacity per 
time unit  and edge speciﬁ c usage costs of .
3.4 Problem deﬁ nition 
Based on the above network, we can now formu-
late an optimization problem, which minimizes the 
overall costs of the network. Th is reﬂ ects, at least 
approximately and under the before-mentioned 
assumptions, the overall traﬃ  c amount within the 
network. In reality, users usually behave egoistically 
and are thus only interested in their own cost mini-
mization and not in the minimization of the over-
all network costs. However, if the capacity on any 
highly prioritized part of the network is a scarce re-
source, even egoistically behaving actors will switch 
to the next best route. Th is way the probable real 
life traﬃ  c amount approximates, at least in a long 
term view, the calculated overall costs of the opti-
mal solution.
Another possible criticism is the fact that the model 
does not consider any diﬀ erentiation between dif-
ferent goods, which means in real life that demand 
for any good of type A, say candles, can be met by 
supplying the node with any good B, say water, as 
long as the amount of TU of the demand equals 
the amount of the supply. To take diﬀ erent type 
of goods in account, or the fact that a company X 
cannot or will not meet the demand of company Y, 
diﬀ erent networks can be set up for each and every 
type of goods and/or company. To get an overall re-
sult a ﬁ rst, prioritized, network model can then be 
solved and the resulting amount of traﬃ  c on every 
single edge can then be deducted from the overall 
capacity of this particular edge.
Th e resulting optimization problem is known as 
the Minimum Cost Flow Problem or Minimal Cost 
Flow Problem in literature and can be modelled as a 
linear program as follows:
෍ܿሺ݁ሻ כ ݂ሺ݁ሻ
௘אா

෍ ݂ሺ݁ሻ െ ෍ ݂ሺ݁ሻ ൌ ܾሺݒሻ׊ݒ א ܸ
௘אேషሺ௩ሻ௘אேశሺ௩ሻ

Ͳ ൑ ݂ሺ݁ሻ ൑ ݑሺ݁ሻ׊݁ א ܧ
Here, , for all , are the decision variables 
of the model. Further,  describes the set of all 
positive neighbours of each  and analogously 
 denotes the set of all negative neighbours of 
.
Th e objective function minimizes the overall costs 
of the network. Th e ﬁ rst constraint guarantees that 
the solution does really represent a ﬂ ow within the 
network that meets all demands and supplies. Th e 
second constraint takes the capacity restrictions of 
the single edges into account.
3.5 Solutions of the problem
Th e above formulated model can be solved in poly-
nomial time, for example with the minimum mean 
cycle cancelling algorithm of Goldberg and Tarjan 
(Goldberg, Tarjan, 1989). Th e result of the optimi-
zation is, other than a complete display of all traﬃ  c 
amounts, an objective value, which represents the 
minimal costs of the overall network. Th is can be 
interpreted as the quantitative assessment of the 
overall network. If a risk is realized the network can 
be adjusted to the new situation by simply deleting 
the destructed edge(s) and/or vertex or vertices. 
Let  be the resulting sub-network with 
 and . Now, the solution space of the 
Minimum Cost Flow Problem on  is a sub-space 
of the solution space of the Minimum Cost Flow 
Problem on G. In particular it holds for the solution 
value that:
οܯܥܨܲ ؔ ܯܥܨܲ൫ܩෘ൯ െ ܯܥܨܲሺܩሻ ൒ Ͳ
Th is diﬀ erence of the objective values can be in-
terpreted as the costs of the realization of the risk. 
With the help of this “risk costs” and the common 
probability of a risk realization  on all edges 
and/or vertices the risk can be assessed as 
ܴ݅ݏ݇൫ܸǡෙ ܧෘ൯ ൌ ܲሺ ෘܸ ǡ ܧෘሻοܯܥܨܲ
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3.6 Limitations of the current approach
In this section, we critically look at the above model 
and examine its strengths and weaknesses by list-
ing diﬀ erent risk scenarios where the model will be 
useful and others where the model could theoreti-
cally be applied, but would not lead to any satisfying 
results. Th eoretically, the model can be applied to 
the “intact network” and an erratic network in any 
case, as long as the risk realization can be identiﬁ ed 
as the total crash of at least one edge or one node of 
the network. However, as the network, in which the 
destroyed edge(s) and/or node(s) are deleted, is only 
optimized once, it cannot reﬂ ect any slowly adopt-
ing process. Instead the optimal solution of the ini-
tial network and the optimal solution of the erratic 
network are calculated and compared. However, 
in real life settings a network will slowly adapt to 
the new situation after the realization of a risk and 
the erratic edge(s) and/or node(s) will be avoided in 
non-optimal ways shortly after the risk is realized. 
Th erefore, the model is most useful and closest to 
the reality for any applications where edge(s) and/
or node(s) are destroyed for a longer period of time. 
In this case the new optimal solution for the erratic 
network can be achieved in real life by guiding the 
traﬃ  c accordingly on all parts of the network.
4. Conclusion and future extensions
Th e future extensions focus on two areas: On the 
one hand, the limitations of the current approach 
need to be eliminated so that the model reﬂ ects 
real-world business processes better, and the ac-
ceptance is increased. Th e most natural extension 
addresses the slow adaption to a crash of parts of 
the network by choosing the following approach:
With the above described model the optimal solu-
tion, which stores the traﬃ  c usage on each edge as 
the ﬂ ow, can be determined for the pre-crash net-
work and the post-crash network. As a part of that 
solution of the pre-crash network the actual ﬂ ows on 
all edges of the network, including the edges crashing 
and those neighbouring crashing edges, are known. 
Assuming a crash on a subset of edges the position 
of all logistical transportations is implicitly given by 
the ﬂ ow on each edge. For the sake of simplicity, the 
positions of currently ﬂ owing transport units can be 
assumed to be at a node within the network. Th is 
could be done, for instance, by assigning half of the 
ﬂ ow on each edge to its start node and half of the 
ﬂ ow to its end node. In the event of a crash, in this 
way we assign all transport units that are within the 
network to a node in the network. By doing that, and 
deleting the crashed edge(s) and/or node(s), we gain 
a new network with manipulated node weights (= de-
mands/supplies), called . Optimizing this net net-
work in the very same way as described above gives 
an optimal value that reﬂ ects an optimal behaviour of 
all parties in an event of a crash. All transport units 
that will be transported at any later points can then 
be assumed to be transported in the (new) optimal 
way through the after-crash network. Th is way we 
receive 3 diﬀ erent optimal values of the same prob-
lem on diﬀ erent networks: ,  and 
. Furthermore, we assume that the time 
for the crashed edge(s) and/or node(s) to recover is 
known as  and the fraction of a time unit when 
the crash occurred is known as . Th e 
costs of the crash can then be calculated as:
ο෨ܯܥܨܲ ൌ 
ܯܥܨܲ൫ܩෘ൯ כ ௥ܶ௘௖ െ ܯܥܨܲ൫ܩ෨൯ כ ሺͳ െ ݐ௖௥௔௦௛ሻ
௥ܶ௘௖ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݐ௖௥௔௦௛ሻ
െ ܯܥܨܲሺܩሻ
Th is extension allows us to consider a two-step opti-
mization of the network towards the new, worse, sit-
uation. However, it does not yet consider a “smooth” 
adaptation process of the whole network nor does it 
tackle  all the remaining gaps between real life ap-
plications and the mathematical model above.
Consequently, further extensions include
 •  a time horizon, which allows the model to 
adapt slowly to a new situation and diﬀ erenti-
ate the costs of a risk depending on the time 
the subnetwork is defunct;
 •  a pre-processing which derives the needed 
data from existing data on logistical network;
 •  the consideration of recovering costs and the 
eﬀ ects recovering works might have on the 
logistical network;
 •  a diﬀ erentiation between diﬀ erent actors and 
diﬀ erent goods in a way that forbids  fulﬁ lling 
a demand of a certain good of a certain sup-
plier by any other good or any other supplier;
 •  mathematical relations between the current 
usage grade and the usage costs to reﬂ ect that 
using a “busy street” might be “slower” than 
using an “empty” street.
On the other hand, future extensions will focus on 
establishing a better provision of data. So far, the data 
situation has not been optimal. For decision making 
within the risk management process, better, i.e. more 
detailed data is necessary.
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ANALIZA I PROCJENA RIZIKA ZA KLJUČNU 
LOGISTIČKU INFRASTRUKTURU
Sažetak 
Logistička infrastruktura predstavlja okosnicu gospodarstva. Bez postavljene učinkovite logističke infra-
strukture, opskrba možda ne bi bila moguća, kako poduzeća tako i potrošača. Međutim, čak i visokokva-
litetna logistička infrastruktura može biti izložena riziku. Stoga je važno deﬁ nirati, analizirati i procijeniti 
rizik za logističku infrastrukturu koji bi mogao ugroziti logističke procese. Donositelji odluka mogu prove-
sti protumjere za smanjenje rizika samo ako su ti rizici poznati i ako je izvršena procjena njihovoga učinka. 
U ovome ćemo članku izraditi pristup na temelju mreže koji će omogućiti procjenu rizika i njihovih po-
sljedica na logističku mrežu. Pokazat ćemo relevantnost ovoga pristupa tako što ćemo ga primijeniti na 
središnju njemačku saveznu pokrajinu Hessen. Iako se danas podatci o transportu detaljno prate i bilježe, 
tipični dnevni rizici, poput prometnih nesreća na autoputu te izvanredni rizici, poput mosta kojemu pri-
jeti urušavanje, terorističkih napada ili katastrofe vezane uz klimu, nisu sustavno predviđeni. Nekoliko je 
studija nedavno otkrilo da ukupni učinak mogućega zatajenja jednoga čvorišta i/ili rubne točke na mreži 
nisu izračunati, a osobito nisu unaprijed određene ključne rubne točke. Mi se bavimo ovim nedostatkom 
informacija pomoću metode koja pomaže pri prepoznavanju i kvantiﬁ ciranju rizika u određenoj mreži. 
Kako bismo postigli ovaj cilj, deﬁ niramo model matematičke optimizacije koji kvantiﬁ cira sadašnje „troš-
kove vezane uz rizik“ cijele mreže te kvantiﬁ ciramo rizik istražujući promjenu ukupnih troškova u slučaju 
da se rizik ostvari.
Ključne riječi: logistika, rizik, otpornost, ključna infrastruktura
